Randomness and Mr. Goodman's Paradox by Cameron, Evan Wm.
 
 
Randomness and Mr. Goodman's Paradox 
 
 
Evan Wm. Cameron 
 
 
Professor Emeritus 
Senior Scholar in Screenwriting 
 
Graduate Programmes,  
Film & Video and Philosophy 
 
York University 
 
 
[Presented in my absence by Professor Robert Cohen (Physics 
and Philosophy, Boston University) to the 'Foundations of 
Probability and Induction' sub-session of the 1975 International 
Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science in 
London, Ontario, Canada on 29 August 1975.] 
 
 
 
 
 
Randomness and Mr. Goodman's Paradox 
 
 
A necessary condition for the justification of any inductive argument of the form 
 
(i)  For all x observed before time Tn, if x has been observed to be E, then x 
has been observed to be G. 
 
(ii) ϕ will be observed at Tn+k to be E. 
 
It is probable therefore that 
 
(iii)  ϕ will be observed at Tn+k to be G. 
 
is that the sampled objects in (i) and the reference object ϕ in (ii) and (iii), prior to being 
observed to be G or not-G, must not be known to possess any property that is known to 
be a necessary condition for an object possessing property G and not property not-G (or 
alternatively possessing property not-G and not property G).  
 
If, for example, one should wish to determine whether or not an arbitrarily chosen 
Lilliputian is likely to be monogamous, and one knows that monogamous Lilliputians, 
unlike their polygamous compatriots, are required by law to live in two-story houses, 
one must not restrict one's sampled and reference objects to those Lilliputians living in 
two-story houses, or one's selection will be biased and one's induction unjustified. By 
satisfying the randomness condition, one would not insure the randomness of 
the selection, for the condition is necessary but not sufficient. By not satisfying the 
condition, however, one would insure the bias of the selection and hence the 
unjustifiability of the consequent induction. 
 
(Randomness thus stands to bias in a relationship similar to that in which verification 
stands to falsification, and their logics evidence a similar Popperian asymmetry. Though 
and can never verify a universal proposition, one may be able to falsify it. Similarly, 
though one can never insure the randomness of a selection of sampled or referenced 
objects, one may be able to demonstrate its bias.) 
 
Consider now any instantiation of the above argument upon which Goodman's paradox 
rests, for example: 
 
(1)  For all x observed before midnight 31 December 2074, if x has been 
observed to be an emerald, then x has been observed to be grue. 
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(2) ϕ will be observed at noon on 01 January 2075 to be an emerald. 
 
It is probable therefore that 
 
(3) ϕ will be observed at noon on 1 January 2075 to be grue.1 
 
Upon reflection, it is apparent that the argument cannot be inductively justifiable, for 
given the definition of 'grue', the randomness condition on the selection of the sampled 
objects in (1) and the reference object ϕ in (2) and (3) cannot be satisfied. 
 
       def  
x is grue    =     x exists before the advent of the year 2050 
and is green, or x exists after the advent of 
the year 2050 and is blue2 
 
By premise (1) and the definition of 'grue', all of the sampled emeralds have been 
observed to be green, and, having been observed to be green before the advent of the 
year 2075, have been observed to be grue. Had any of the sampled emeralds been 
observed to be green but been observed to be green after the advent of the year 2075, 
they could not – by definition – have been observed to be grue. Being observed to be 
green, in other words, is insufficient for determining the grueness of the sampled 
emeralds; they must have been observed to be green before the advent of the year 
2075. Having the property 
 
existing before the advent of the year 2075 
 
is thus a necessary condition for the sampled green emeralds being grue and not being 
not-grue. But since the sampled emeralds were selected from only those emeralds 
known to exist before the advent of the year 2075, each of the sampled emeralds 
must be known to possess a property that is a necessary condition for it being grue and 
not being not-grue, prior to its grueness being observed, thus violating the randomness 
condition. 
 
Similarly, by premise (2) and the definition of 'grue', the reference object ϕ will be 
observed to be an emerald after the advent of the year 2075. If the conclusion (3) of the 
                                                     
1 See Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (2nd edition) (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), pages 72-81. 
2 Ibid., page 74. In Goodman's words, the predicate 'grue' "applies to all things 
examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue". 
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argument should be true, however, then ϕ will also be observed to be blue after the 
advent of the year 2075 and hence be observed to be grue.3 Were ϕ to be observed to 
be blue before the advent of the year 2075, it could not – by definition – be observed to 
be grue. Being observed to be blue, in other words, is insufficient for determining the 
grueness of ϕ; ϕ must be observed to be blue after the advent of the year 2075. Having  
the property 
 
existing after the advent of the year 2075 
 
is thus a necessary condition for the blue ϕ being grue and not being not-grue. But since 
ϕ will be selected from only those objects known to exist after the advent of the year 
2075, ϕ must be known to possess a property that is a necessary condition for it being 
grue and not being not-grue prior to its grueness being observed, thus violating the 
randomness condition. 
 
Every sampled object in (1) and the reference object ϕ in (2) and (3), therefore, must be 
known to possess at least one property that is known to be a necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition for it being grue and not being not-grue, prior to its grueness being 
assessed, thus violating the randomness condition. 
 
Although it is true, therefore, that the "temporal quality" of the predicate 'grue' is 
"merely accidental" (in the sense that there are many properties other than temporality 
about which systematic violations of the randomness condition could be constructed for 
any predicate, including 'grue'), the truth is irrelevant to the flaw in the induction; for 
Goodman has violated the randomness condition that 'grue' imposes, accidentally or 
otherwise, through the temporal character explicit in its definition.4 Were it to be 
defined differently, but were its definition to impose a similar bias upon the sampled or 
reference objects denoted in the premises of an induction, the resulting inference 
would be equally (and equally obviously) unjustifiable. 
 
Nor is Goodman's vaunted "relativity" argument sufficient to sustain the purported 
paradox.5 Since all inductions make predictions about reference objects that must be 
confirmed or disconfirmed through observations made later than the observations on 
the sampled objects (predictions, that is, that must be confirmed or disconfirmed in the 
future), it should be apparent from the above discussion that all predicates having a 
                                                     
3 If the conclusion of the argument should be false, the resulting induction could be 
shown to be unjustifiable by a formally similar argument. 
4 The quoted phrases are from Jay Hullett and Robert Schwartz, "Grue: Some Remarks", 
The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 64, 11 May 1967, page 261. 
5 The word 're1ativity" is Goodman's own. See Goodman, op. cit., pages 79-81. 
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defined temporal quality like 'grue' must be inductively useless, for they cannot be used 
in inductions without violating the randomness condition.6 It is impossible, in other 
words, to select a random sample when using such predicates inductively. (Only God, 
existing outside time itself, could select a temporally random sample of objects in time 
having the property, for example, of being 'grue'. But God, existing outside time itself 
and hence able to select such a random sample, would have no need to make 
inductions.) To point out, as Goodman does, that the predicates 'green' and 'blue' would 
be similarly defective to users of the 'grue'-'bleen' language, is both true and irrelevant.7 
Users of such a language would indeed be prohibited from using 'green' and 'blue' in 
inductions on pain of violating the randomness condition, but they would also be 
prohibited from using 'grue' and 'bleen' for the same reason! They would therefore be 
prohibited from making justifiable predictions about either the greenness, blueness, 
grueness or bleenness of emeralds, whereas users of the 'green'-'blue' language, 
prohibited only from using 'grue' and 'bleen', are free to construct justifiable inductions 
about the predicted greenness or blueness of emeralds to their hearts' content. 
 
If one systematically violates an obvious and necessary condition for the justifiability of 
an induction, as Goodman has done, one can hardly be ingenuously surprised when the 
resulting inference contradicts a non-violating induction (the induction that results, for 
example, when the predicate 'green' is substituted for the predicate 'grue' in premises 
(1) and (3) above). From a suitably biased sample, a suitably contradictory inference of 
course can be drawn. But the obvious bias of the sample precludes paradox however 
contradictory the resulting inference. The puzzle concerning 'grue', therefore, is not 
that its use results in contradictory inferences, but rather that so many philosophers 
have been surprised by the fact. 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 The predictions that are confirmed or disconfirmed by future evidence may, of course, 
convey information about reference objects existing only in the past. The confirmations and 
disconfirmations of the predictions, however, must come later than the observations on the 
sampled objects for an induction to have occurred. 
7 'bleen', in Goodman's words, "applies to emeralds examined before time t just in case 
they are blue and to other emeralds just in case they are green". See Goodman, op. cit., page 
79. 
